The paper proposes a dynamic version of the frictionless Becker-Shapley-Shubik marriage matching model with transferable utility. Its primary objective is to develop a tractable model that rationalizes the marriage distribution of 'who marries whom' by age. This behavioral dynamic model rationalizes a new marriage matching function. An empirical methodology that relies on the equilibrium outcomes of the model identifies the marital preferences over spouses. This framework also allows the inverse problem of computing the vector of aggregate marriages given a new distribution of available single individuals and estimated preferences to be solved. The solution to this inverse problem has been shown to exist under mild conditions. This paper also develops a simple test of the model's empirical validity. 
Introduction
The marriage distribution of 'who marries whom' by age shows many well known empirical regularities. There is strong assortative matching by age with men marrying slightly younger women. As the number of available single men and women falls with age, so do the marriage rates. While these empirical regularities are not static and have changed over time and differ across countries, these qualitative features have generally remain consistent. The timing of marriage has a significant effect on the formation and organization of families, including the timing of childbirth, the division of home production, etc.
The paper proposes a dynamic version of the frictionless Becker-Shapley-Shubik marriage matching model using transferable utility. Its primary objective is to develop a tractable dynamic model that rationalizes the marriage distribution of 'who marries whom' by age together with its empirical regularities. It also extends the static frictionless marriage matching framework of Choo and Siow (2006) into an overlapping generations framework. The behavioral dynamic model rationalizes a new marriage matching function. I develop an empirical methodology to identify preferences over spouse from marriage that relies on the equilibrium outcomes of the model. It provides an economic interpretation of these estimated parameters.
1 This framework also allows the inverse problem of computing the vector of aggregate marriage given a new distribution of available single individuals and estimated preferences to be solved. The proposed type of transferable utility matching model that has been shown to be equivalent to an optimal transportation linear programming problem. The solution to this type of problems has been shown to exist under mild conditions. This paper also develops a simple test of the model's empirical validity. Using aggregate data of new marriages and available single men and women in the US in the 1970 and 1980, I demonstrate its application by looking at the the changes in the gains in marriage over this decade and compare the results with those obtained from a static model.
Over the two decades from 1970 to 1990, there has been a well documented fall in the marriage rates in the US. Part of this decline can be explained by socio-political changes that affected the institution of marriage. Changes like the national legalization of abortion following the Supreme Court ruling on Roe versus Wade has been argued to lower the gains to marriage. The empirical methodology developed in this paper allows the total gains to marriage to be identified. This is the present discounted net present value from marriage today relative to the present discounted per period utility from remaining single (forever). The empirical analysis shows that the dynamic component of the gains to marriage is a large component of the total gains from marriage. This is especially true since most marriage occur when individuals are young when there are still many future opportunities of participating in the marriage market as the individuals age. The decision to marry early suggests that the implied present discounted relative returns from locking into marriage early is high. When analyzing the change in the gains to marriage over these two decades, I show that ignoring the dynamic component of marriage gains severely understate the decline in the gains to marriage among the young.
The first empirical implementation of the static Becker-Shapley-Shubik marriage matching model with additively separable utilities in a discrete choice framework was proposed in Choo and Siow (2006) . This paper maintains many of the minimal a priori assumptions of the static marriage matching model of Choo and Siow (2006) . Methodologically, the formulation of the model in this paper uses the dynamic discrete choice framework of Rust (1987) . The joint payoff to a match depends on the ages of the couple. Each cohort of single males and females enters the marriage market at age zero.
At each age, a single individual faced with the marital returns associated with his or her age decides whether to marry or remain single. In this dynamic environment, the single individual understand that his or her type changes over time as he or she ages. The agents are rational and have an expectation of the marriage opportunities in the future as they age.
An earlier paper of Choo and Siow (2005) also shares a similar objective of attempting to model the bivariate marriage distribution by age and uses the same building block of the dynamic discrete choice framework of Rust (1987 where a linearized structure was placed on the per period utilities from marriage. This linearization allowed us to empirically approximate the benefit of delaying marriage for one period versus marrying today using the growth rate of marriages. This approximation become the basis on which different theories of marital and home production were tested.
The dynamic model in this paper takes a more modest partial equilibrium approach.
It takes the vector of available single individuals at the beginning of each period as given. I do not model how this vector of single individuals evolve dynamically and how it is affected by mortality, migration and marriage. This paper also proposes a very different representation of the dynamic problem that is empirically tractable. This new representation allows me to solve the model and derive the implied closed form marriage matching function. This new marriage matching function is the dynamic analogue of the one proposed in Choo and Siow (2006) . I also propose a new empirical methodology that relies on the equilibrium outcomes of the model to identify the primitives of the model. Unlike Choo and Siow (2005) , no structure is placed on the per period marital returns. This paper also focuses on identification of net present discounted utility from a match and the inverse problem associated with the application of the marriage matching function.
2 The survey paper of Siow (2008) also provides a two period detailed exposition of the dynamic model of Choo and Siow (2005) .
Related Literature:
There is a growing body of empirical papers on marriage matching. Choo A closely related paper is Hitsch, Hortaçsu and Ariely (2010), which focus on identifying preferences separately from the matching process. Employing a dataset from an online dating service, they estimate a rich specification of preference over spousal physical and socio-economic characteristics. Using the estimated preferences, they simulate the men-and women-optimal matchings using the Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm. The paper goes on to compare these optimal matchings to the actual matches observed in the online dating dataset.
3 Higher-caste females lose their caste-status if they marry a lower-caste male.
4 Using a major online dating website in South Korea, Lee and Niederle (2011) conducted an experiment to see how preference signaling in the form of a virtual rose can help chances in online dating.
A Dynamic Matching Model

Preview of Results
The equilibrium dynamic marriage matching model in this paper delivers a new marriage matching function given by equation (1) The marriage matching function is given by,
The term z ij = Z − max (i, j) ≥ 0 represents the maximum length of a match before one of the spouse in the match passes away at the terminal age Z. S denotes the probability a marriage survives in any period 5 and β is the per period discount factor. µ i0 and µ 0j denote the number of type i men and type j women who chose to remain single at age i and j respectively. This equation also needs to satisfy a set of accounting constraints.
6
I will show that the structural parameter ln Π ij can be interpreted as the present discounted value from an (i, j) marriage relative to the present discounted per-period utility for the couple from being single forever. I outline an estimation strategy to point identify the matrix of parameters Π given a vector of aggregate matches and available individuals, (µ, m, f ). These parameters are structural in that they are invariant to marriage market demand and supply changes and capture the preferences of individuals in the market. For the empirical application of this model, practitioners are often interested in the inverse problem. 7 That is, given an estimated vector Π consistent with a vector of aggregate matches (µ, m, f ), satisfying equation (1) 6 The accounting constraints are
µ 0j , µ i0 , µ ij ≥ 0 for all i and j.
I will describe these constraints in more detail in Section 2.4. 
Assumptions
The proposed framework employs the dynamic discrete choice framework introduced by Rust (1987) . Agents are horizontally differentiated into types that change over time.
8
Specifically, I focus on type as defined by age and attempt to empirically characterize the marriage distribution by age.
9
Stationarity: Consider a stationary society populated by overlapping generations of adults. For expositional convenience, I assume that each individual lives for Z periods irrespective of gender. 10 The youngest adult is of age one. The age of a male is indexed by i and the age of a female is indexed by j. In any period, the type of an adult is defined by his or her age, and let m i and f j denote the numbers of single males of age i and females of age j at the beginning of each period. The society is stationary in the sense that the vector single men and women
and {f j } Z j=1 are exogenous and taken as given.
11
State Variables: Any single type i male indexed g (or type j female indexed G) in each period is characterized by two state variables,
• i (or j) ∈ {1, . . . , Z} is his (or her) age when single, and
is a (Z +1) vector of i.i.d idiosyncratic payoffs or match specific errors specific to type i male individual, g (or type j female, G), that is unobserved to 8 Sautmann (2011) extends the Shimer and Smith's (2000) transferable utility model of search and matching to allow for types (defined by age) that change continuously over time. She derives conditions for positive and negative assortative matching and differential age matching.
9 While age is clearly not a complete characterization of type, the proposed methodology can be easily extended to deal with fixed horizontal attributes or types such as race, religion and education. 10 This assumption can be relaxed to allow for differential mortality by age and gender without changing the qualitative results of the model. Actions: a ig (or a jG ) denote the action of a single type i male g (or single type j female G) where a ig (or a jG ) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Z}. If he (or she) chooses to remain single, a ig = 0 (or a jG = 0), else if he (or she) chooses to match with a type k spouse, a ig = k (or a jG = k).
Exogenous Parameters: The time discount factor is denoted by β ∈ (0, 1). Marriages may end in divorce or the death of a spouse. Divorce occurs at some exogenous rate, δ. I assume that δ = 0 in the first year of marriage for all (i, j) pairs and δ = 1 in the kth year where max(i, j) + k > Z. If divorce occurs in period k of a marriage, where
, the individuals g and G reenter the marriage market as single individuals of age i + k and j + k respectively. Let the survival probability of marriage be denoted by S = 1 − δ. 12 I do not distinguish the previous marital status of the single men and women.
AS and CI: The specification of preferences over partners satisfy two assumptions: the Additive Separability and Conditional Independence assumptions. Both these assumptions were introduced by Rust (1987) in the context of a single agent dynamic discrete choice model. Let the utility of a single male g with state vector (i, ig ) from action a ig be denoted by v(a ig , i, ig ). The utility of a single female individual G with state 12 The formulation carries through when I allow for duration dependence in the divorce hazard.
vector (j, jG ) from action a jG be denoted by w(a jG , j, jG ). I assume that the following assumptions hold:
Assumption AS Additive Separability:
The utility functions v(a ig , i, ig ) and w(a jG , j, jG ) have additively separable decompositions of the form,
where iag and jaG are the ath component of the vector ig and jG respectively.
Assumption CI Conditional Independence:
The transition probability of the state variables for males and females respectively factorize as
where h( ) is the multivariate pdf of the i.i.d , and F a (i | i) (or R a (j | j)) is the probability that the male (or female) individual will next be single again at i (or j ) given action a and his (or her) current age i (or j).
I also maintain the assumption introduced in Choo and Siow (2006) that ig is drawn from MacFadden's type I extreme value distribution.
13
The CI limits the dependence structure on the state variables. As discussed in Rust (1994), it says that the observed states i (and j ) are sufficient statistics for the unobserved states ig (and jG ). Any dependence between and is transmitted through ages i and j . F a (i | i) is the transition probability that a type i male g will next find himself single at age i given his action a at age i. Similarly R a (j | j) is the transition probability that a type j female G will next find herself single at age j given her action 13 The marginal density is given by h(
, where c is the Euler constant.
a. are iid noise that are superimposed on this process. I will go into the details of the structure of the utilities in the next section. F a (r | i) is the transition probability that a type i male g will next find himself single at age r given his action a. Clearly F a (r | i) = 0 for all r ≤ i and all a. If g chooses to be single a = 0, F 0 (r | i) = 1 for r = i + 1 and zero elsewhere. If g chooses to match with a type j spouse (a=j), F a (r | i) takes the form, For i < r ≤ Z,
Similarly R a (r | j) is the transition probability that a type j female G will next find herself single at age r given her action a. R a (r | j) = 0 for all r ≤ j and all a. For action a = 0, R 0 (r | j) = 1 for r = j + 1 and zero elsewhere. If she chooses to match with a type i spouse (a=i), R a (r | j) takes the form,
Functional Form of Utilities: The model adopts a full commitment framework; the decision to marry locks an individual into a stream of payoffs in the event that the marriage does not dissolve due to divorce or death of either spouse. Let α ijk be the k th period marital output accrued to a type i male when married to a type j female today. Similarly γ ijk be the k th period marital output accrued to a type j female when married to a type i male.
Suppose male g (or female G) chooses to marry an age j female (or i male), his (or her) one period utility functions (given by Equations (2) and (3) above) respectively are
where the present discounted gains from the match α i (j) and γ j (i) take the form,
α i0 and γ 0j are the per-period utilities from remaining single for i type males and j type females respectively. Recall that z ij = Z − max (i, j) captures the maximum length of the match given the terminal age of Z.
Equation (8) says that if g marries a type j women, he receives the mean utility from the match equal to α i (j) − τ ij , plus an idiosyncratic shock ijg . The mean utility depends only on the type of men and women in the match and does not depend on the precise identity of the spouse or the decision maker g.
k=0 (βS) k α ijk captures the present discounted stream of male marital payoffs in the event that the marriage does not dissolve. In choosing this match, g commits to pay a once off transfer, τ ij specific to these two types of individuals matching. Similarly in equation (9), single females G of type j who decide to marry type i men agree to receive this equilibrium transfer.
In accepting the match, she locks herself to a stream of marital payoffs, of which the present discounted value equals z ij k=0 (βS) k γ ijk . So, if individual g of type i wants to marry a woman G of type j, he has to transfer τ ij of marital output to her. Similarly, if woman G of type j wants to marry man g of type i, she has to be willing to accept τ ij of marital output from him. Each individual takes τ ij as exogenous. The marriage market clears when given τ ij , for every i, j, the number of type i men who want to marry type j women is equal to the number of type j women who want to marry type i men.
This transfer can be positive or negative. In this full-commitment model, the one time payment of τ ij fully internalizes the discounted stream of within marriage utilities for this couple, the exogenous divorce probabilities and the relative scarcity of males and females in the system.
The Agents' Decision Problem
The single male at age i chooses a sequence of decisions a ig = {a ig , a i+1g , . . . a Zg }, where a ig = a(i, ig ) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Z} is the expected discounted utilities maximizing choice g makes in the event that he is single at age i. The value function V α (i, g ) is defined by
Similarly for single age j women G, her value function takes the form
where a jG = {a jG , a j+1G , . . . , a ZG }. The Bellman equations for male g and female G
respectively takes the familiar form
Integrated Value Functions: Rust (1987) showed that Assumptions AS and CI allow the Bellman equations be represent in a form where the unobservables are integrated out. Let V i and W j be the corresponding integrated value function for a single age i male and j female respectively. That is
The integrated Bellman equation for a single type i male and type j female then takes the form,
Consider decomposing the integrated value function V i and W j in equations (11) and (12) into a mean component that is dependent on the utility maximizing choice and an idiosyncratic component. This decomposition together with the distributional assumption provides a closed form representation for the conditional choice probabilities of a particular type of spouse.
The mean component also referred to as the choice specific value functions for type i males and j females is denoted byṽ ij andw ij respectively. They arẽ
This provides an alternative representation for male g's and female G's optimization problem that is convenient when talking about stability in Section 2.7.
14 The value functions can now be written as
Let the conditional choice probability P ij denote the probability that choice j is the optimal choice for males at age i, that is P ij = I{j = arg max a∈D (ṽ ia + iag )}h(d ).
Similarly for females, Q ij is the probability that choice i is the optimal choice for females at age j. That is, Q ij = I{i = arg max a∈D (w aj + ajG )}h(d ). The conditional choice probability can be expressed as a function of the normalized choice value functions, (ṽ ij −ṽ i0 ). In our case, the probability that a type i male who matches with a type j female will have the familiar multinomial logit form,
and similarly for females,
In this finite horizon case, the integrated value functions for male and females also take a convenient recursive structure,
Equation 17 says that the expected value of participating in the marriage market at age i, V i can be divided into two components. The first is the expected utility from being single this period which is comprised of α i0 + c and the expected value of participating in the marriage market next period as an older (i + 1) individual represented by βV i+1 .
The second term, − log P i0 captures the expected utility from choosing to be married at age i. If the marriage rate for type i males is high, (or the probability of being single, P i0 is low), then the expected utility from being locked into marriage is high.
Equilibrium and the Dynamic Marriage Matching Function
The log-odds ratio of an (i, j) match relative to i remaining single in can also be expressed in terms of normalized choice specific value functions,ṽ ij −ṽ i0 . It describes the expected payoffs for an i type male marrying a j type female relative to remaining single that period. This is given by log
The term α i (j) = z ij k=1 (βS) k α ijk represents the stream of expected period utility he gets from the match in the event that the marriage does not dissolve. Abusing notation slightly, α i (0) denotes
In the event of divorce or death of a spouse at age (i + k) < Z where 0 < k ≤ z ij , his expected value of being single is α i+k + c + ln P −1 i+k,0 + βV i+k+1 . By repeated use of the recursive equations (17) and (18), it can be shown that at each age i + k of marriage, the difference in expected utility from being locked in marriage and participating in the marriage market that period is represented by α i k ,j+k − α i+k,0 − β(1 − δ)(c + ln P −1 i+k,0 ). ln P i+k,0 is a statistic for the gains from participating in the marriage market at i + k. In choosing this match, the i type male commits to pay a one-time match specific transfer τ ij to his spouse.
Similarly for females, the log-odds ratio that a j type female marries an i type male relative to remaining single equals the difference in choice specific value functions
Equation (20) gives the difference in systematic expected payoffs for a j type female marrying an i type male relative to remaining single that period. The interpretation of the various terms in (20) is analogous to that for males. Recall that γ k ij is the females share of the marital output in the k th period of marriage for a couple that marry when the male and female ages are i and j respectively. When the marriage does not dissolve, the female share of the discounted within marriage payoffs is γ j (i) =
she agrees to this match, she receives an equilibrium transfer τ ij from her partner. Given that divorce occurs at an exogenous rate δ, the term δ(γ 0,j+k +c+βW 0,j+k+1 +ln Q −1 0,j+k ) captures the expected value of re-entering the marriage market in the future in the event of divorce. The first term γ 0j is the systematic payoff to j from remaining single which is common to all j females. The interpretation of the remaining parameters is analogous to the male counterpart of equation (20) .
Rearranging the terms of the the log-odds ratios in Equations (19) and (20) delivers a system of (Z × Z) quasi-demand and quasi-supply equations respectively.
The constant κ is the geometric sum of Euler's constants, κ = cβS(1 − (βS) z ij )/(1 − βS). 15 The left hand side of equation (21) is the log of an (i, j) choice probabilities P ij , scaled by the weighted average of the probabilities of remaining single in the future z ij k=0 (βS) k ln P i+k,0 . The denominator represents the opportunity cost of future participation in the marriage market that an i type male incurs when he chooses to match with a j type female. When the probability of remaining single in the future, P i+k,0 is large, then the forgone opportunity of being locked into marriage is small and vice versa.
This ratio equals the difference in present discounted utilities from being locked into an (i, j) relative to the present discounted value of being single forever, (α i (j) − α i (0)) less the equilibrium transfer, τ ij that needs to be paid. The interpretation for equation (22) in terms of female match probabilities is similar. The central difference being that the type j female is the recipient of the transfer.
Definition 1:
A marriage market equilibrium consists of a vector of males, m and females, f across individual type, the vector of marriage µ, and the vector of transfers, τ such that the number of i type men who want to marry j type spouses exactly equals the number of j type women who agree to marry type i men for all combinations of (i, j). That is, for each of the (Z × Z) sub-markets,
Dynamic Marriage Matching Function: Let p ij and q ij denote the maximum likelihood estimators of the probability that type i male matches with type j female, P ij and type j female matches with i male, Q ij respectively. That is, p ij = µ ij /m i and q ij = µ ij /f j . The above marriage market clearing conditions and the ML estimators for the choice probabilities is applied to the system of quasi-supply and demand equations, (21) and (22) respectively to derive the Dynamic Marriage Matching Function for an demand and quasi-supply of spouses corresponding to the case when z ij = 0. That is 16 given by Equation (1) shown earlier,
The dynamic marriage matching function also needs to satisfy the accounting constraints given by Equations (23), (24) and (25):
Equation (23) says that the total number of j type women who marry and the number of unmarried j type women must be equal to the number of available j type women for all j. Similarly Equation (24) says that the total number of women who marry i type men and the number of unmarried i type men must be equal to the number of available i type men for all i. Equation (25) Given a matrix of preferences Π, whose elements are non-negative and strictly positive 16 This condition ensures that neither spouse is at a terminal age. If z ij = 0, the Dynamic Marriage
Matching Function reduces to the static marriage matching function of Choo and Siow (2006) , that is
population vectors, m and f , does there exist a unique non-negative marital distribution µ that is consistent with Π, that satisfies equations (23), (24), (25) and (20) .
Taking Π ij , m and f as exogenously given, Equation (1) defines a I × J system of polynomials with the I × J elements of µ as unknowns. Like in Choo-Siow (2006) , the model can be reformulated to an I + J system with I + J number of unmarrieds of each type, µ i0 and µ 0j , as unknowns. This reduced system defined by equations (26) and (27) below is derived by summing Equation (1) over all i's and Equation (1) over all j's respectively. After solving for µ i0 and µ 0j , then the µ ij 's are fully determined by Equation (1).
Existence and Uniqueness
As noted in Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim (2009), transferable utility marriage matching model is equivalent to an optimal transportation (Monge-Kantorovich) linear programming problem. 17 They showed that optimal assignment in (Monge-Kantorovich) linear programming problem corresponds to stable matching and that optimal assignment are shown to exist under mild conditions. This equivalence brings to bear the wide body of knowledge about linear programming and optimal transportation. Despite the complication arising from the dynamics, the formulation of the marriage matching model in this paper reduces to a structure identical to that introduced by Choo and As for uniqueness, linear programming models on compact convex feasible set generically have unique solutions. However for finite population, stable matching is generally not unique. It is possible to marginally alter the individual payoffs without violating the conditions for stability. In the limit as the population becomes large, uniqueness is established. I again refer interested readers to Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim (2009) for more precise statements.
Identification
Dynamic Gains to Marriage
Choo and Siow (2006) 
The dynamic analogue of this statistic derived from Equation (1) takes the following form,
The interpretation of the statistic is similar to the static case. It gives the present discounted utility from being locked in an (i, j) match relative to the present discounted sum of the per period payoff from being single forever. 18 This statistic is point identified.
The right hand side of (29) comprise of only the primitives of the model and are invariant to changes in the vectors of unmarried men, m, and women, f . It becomes the basis of the empirical application in Section 3. I will refer to the statistic 2 ln π ij as defined by Equation (28) as Static Gains and 2 ln Π ij from Equation (29) as Dynamic Gains.
Bootstrap Standard Errors
The representation of the matching function in Equation (29) The asymptotic distribution for the gains statistic is complicated by the covariance structure of P ij and P kj where i = k which depends on the underlying assumption of the model. Choo (2012) compares the coverage of the proposed block bootstrap method with the asymptotic distribution of the dynamic gains statistic.
A Test of the Model
Equations (21) and (22) can be expressed in terms of the maximum likelihood estimators p ij and q ij . That is,
Let
and
Proposition 1 below provides a simple test for our model:
Proposition 1 Holding α ijk , γ ijk , and δ ijk fixed for all (i, j, k), any changes in available men m i or women f j that leads to an increase in n ij (µ, m, f ) would also lead to a decrease in N ij (µ, m, f ) and vice versa.
In other words, any changes in relative scarcity of men and women that changes the market clearing division of surplus τ ij would make n ij and N ij move in opposite directions. If our model is true, a simple regression of estimates ofn ij (µ, m, f ) against
give a slope coefficient of -1.
Stability
Browning, Chiappori and Weiss (2007) and Chiappori, Salaniè and Weiss (2010) introduced a stable matching characterization for preference utility that maintains the additive separability structure introduced in Choo and Siow (2006) . These stable matching characterizations consist of a set of inequalities that translate naturally when defining equilibrium probabilities of different types of matches as in Choo and Siow (2006) . These characterizations have significant implications in the empirical implementation of models with this additively separable structure. The dynamic marriage matching outlined here maintains the additively separable structure. Equations (13) and (14) show that despite this more complicated dynamic setting, the choice specific utilities still maintain the additively separable structure. The choice specific utilities can be decomposed into a mean choice specific value function and an i.i.d. idiosyncratic component. For completeness, the stable matching characterization of Chiappori, Salaniè and Weiss (2010) is reproduced in Lemma 2 of the appendix. The Static Gains for an (i, j) pair is computed by taking the natural log of the number of current (i, j) matches divided by the geometric averages of those i and j types that 23 In Figure 2 b ) and 2 c), a non-parametric estimate is used to predict the gains for those age pairs where no marriages is observed. This typically happens for matches with large age differential, that is when a young individual is matched with a much older individual. 25 For age pairs where no matches were observed, a non-parametric conditional mean was used to predict the gains. In those cases, no standard error nor confidence interval is computed accounting for the gaps in the plots of the 95% confidence intervals. the differences for males and 4 c) and 4 d) plots the differences for females. Generally all these plots suggest that there has been a fall in the gains to marriage over this decade.
After accounting for the forgone future marriage opportunities using the Dynamic Gains, 
